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A First Amendment Approach to Generic Drug
Manufacturer Tort Liability
In 2011, the landmark case PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing' foreclosed many claims
against generic drug manufacturers for harms caused by their products. In
particular, Mensing held that because the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) requires generic manufacturers to use labels that are "the same as" the
FDA-approved brand-name label,' the FDCA preempts state-law tort claims
against these manufacturers for failing to communicate the potential risks of
their products.
Mensing's outcome has been subject to widespread policy objections.
Generic manufacturers, now immune from liability, are consequently also
insulated from incentives to warn patients and physicians of known risks.
Patients with grave injuries find themselves unable to recover for the harms
they have suffered. And brand-name manufacturers increasingly are forced to
defend themselves in court from dubious legal theories pressed by plaintiffs
who were harmed by generic products.
This Comment identifies a never-before-raised legal problem with the
FDA's current labeling regulations, which, if resolved by the courts, could
address the policy concerns arising from Mensing. In Mensing, the FDA
interpreted its regulations to prohibit generic drug manufacturers from
communicating independently with physicians about pharmaceutical risks.
The outcome in Mensing was reached without any party raising the First
Amendment issues surrounding generic pharmaceutical manufacturer liability.
Yet the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies to speech by
1. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
2. 21 U.S.C. 5 3 5 5 (j)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G) (2012).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers: regulatory burdens on such speech must be
justified by narrow tailoring to advance sufficient government interests.3 A
recent Second Circuit case applying these principles, United States v. Caronia,4
illustrates how plaintiffs could seek tort damages from generic manufacturers
once more. If Caronia's reasoning is applied in the context of tort suits against
generic manufacturers, those manufacturers will no longer be able to take
refuge behind the FDA labeling regulations that currently prevent them from
warning consumers about risks. In consequence, plaintiffs injured by generic
pharmaceuticals would be able to recover from generic manufacturers for
failure to warn when those manufacturers failed to communicate warning
information to physicians.
This argument is all the more relevant given the ongoing discussion about
whether and how to reform the regulatory regime in the wake of Mensing. The
constitutional infirmity of the status quo provides an essential starting point
for any future reform. A recent Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking by the
FDA suggests that the agency is considering new regulations that would
liberate generic drug manufacturers to alert customers to health risks,
potentially undoing the federal preemption of state tort law established in
Mensing.s This early proposal can find validation not only from the policy
advantages of restoring state tort claims against generic manufacturers, but
also from the recognition that it would resolve an important, albeit thus far
overlooked, tension in constitutional law. But it remains to be seen whether
and precisely how the FDA will ultimately address the problems Mensing
created.
Part I explains the regulatory environment and the Mensing decision, which
created the problem this Comment confronts. Part II turns to a different realm
of pharmaceutical regulation: the uses for which manufacturers may market
their products, as well as recent developments in speech jurisprudence
declaring that pharmaceutical manufacturers have a right to communicate with
physicians. Part III examines the contradiction of these divergent lines of cases
and concludes that Mensing's holding, based on an impermissible regulatory
interpretation, must yield to the speech interests identified in Part II. Restoring
the speech rights of manufacturers would vindicate First Amendment values,
3. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
4. 703 F. 3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
s. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological
Products, OFF. INFO. & REG. AFFAIRs, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/servlet
/ForwardServlet?SearchTarget=Agenda&textfield=o9lo-AG9 4 (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).
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restore liability and the corresponding set of incentives for generic
manufacturers to attend to their products' safety, and allow injured patients to
recover for the harms done to them.
I. THE MENSING PROBLEM
This Part contextualizes the Mensing decision and explains why it is so
objectionable. Brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers face
sharply differing obligations under federal law and regulations. These
divergent regulatory regimes resulted in the problematic Mensing holding,
which immunized generic manufacturers from tort liability. Mensing created an
array of urgent problems without good solutions. Courts are wrestling with
fraught liability questions and sometimes rendering decisions dubiously
consonant with principles of tort law. And while injured plaintiffs and brand-
name manufacturers fight these battles in courts throughout the nation, the
generic manufacturers whose products actually injure consumers remain
immune from suit.
The availability of safe and inexpensive generic versions of brand-name
drugs is a substantial public good.' Accordingly, Congress has provided a
simplified route for approval of generic formulations.7 The critical requirement
for this streamlined application process is that the generic formulation must be
actually "bioequivalent" or therapeutically identical to the brand drug.' This
minimizes entry costs for generic manufacturers, while ensuring that generic
formulations have the same effectiveness and safety as clinically tested, FDA-
approved, brand-name formulations. 9 Correspondingly, unless a physician
specifically prescribes one formulation or another, pharmacies may substitute a
less expensive generic for a brand-name drug at their discretion.'o
6. See H.R. REP. No. 98-857, Pt. 2, at 9 (1984) (identifying the "policy objective of getting safe
and effective generic substitutes on the market as quickly as possible after the expiration of
the patent").
7. Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012)).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 675
(1990).
9. But see Lars Noah, Adding Insult to Injury: Paying for Harms Caused by a Competitor's Copycat
Product, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 673, 678 n.21 (2010) (collecting popular and
professional discussion of the bioequivalence standard's efficacy).
io. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2583 (2011) ("Currently, all States have some form
of generic substitution law.").
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All manufacturers are required to submit annual reports containing
information relating to the safety, effectiveness, and appropriate labeling of
approved drugs." Brand-name manufacturers, unlike generic manufacturers,
are also responsible for the "accuracy and adequacy" of the label of a drug 2 and
may modify its label to reflect new information. The FDA then approves or
denies the manufacturer's label modification through the "Changes Being
Effected" (CBE) process. 3 A generic manufacturer, in contrast, is responsible
only for ensuring "that its warning label is the same as" the FDA-approved
brand-name label.'4 This reinforces the fact of actual chemical equivalence by
ensuring that doctors and patients perceive the therapeutic identity between
formulations.
State tort law often, as in the dispute which became PLIVA v. Mensing,
holds drug manufacturers liable for failing to maintain reasonably safe
warnings on labels, including failing to employ the CBE process to revise their
labels. 5 Under FDA regulations, however, generic manufacturers may not
proactively revise their labels because of their duty to ensure that their labels
are identical to brand-name manufacturers' labels. 6
In Mensing, the Court confronted the problem arising from these
conflicting requirements. The plaintiffs were prescribed the brand-name drug
Reglan and, after taking an approved generic formulation, developed a severe
neurological disorder. 7 They alleged that, despite evidence that the labeling
didn't adequately warn of the risk of this reaction, neither brand-name nor
generic manufacturers had revised the drug label or advised the FDA.'" Had the
plaintiffs taken brand-name Reglan, they would have been entitled to seek
recovery under state-law failure-to-warn claims, assuming proof of their
11. 21 C.F.R. S 314.81 (2013) (brand-name manufacturers); id. § 314.98 (generic manufacturers).
1n. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (citing 21 U.S.C. §3 5 5 (b)(1), (d) (20o6)).
13. 21 C.F.R. 5 314-70(c)(3), (c)(6)(iii)(A), (c)(7) (2013).
14. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2574 (emphasis added) (citing 21 U.S.C. 5 3 5 5 (0)(2)(A)(v), (j)(4)(G)
(20o6)); 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.94(a)(8), 314.127(a)(7) (2013).
is. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2573, 2575.
16. Id. at 2575.
17. Id. at 2572-73.
18. Id. at 2573.
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allegations.1 9 As the plaintiffs took a generic formulation, however, they -
properly -brought the same claim against the generic manufacturer.
The plaintiffs made three principal arguments supporting the claim that
generic manufacturers, despite the duty of sameness, could have satisfied their
duties under state tort law. First, the plaintiffs argued that generic
manufacturers should have themselves requested that the FDA approve a
revision to the label shared by both the brand and generic versions of the drug
at issue."o The Court rejected this argument. As this option still required the
FDA's acquiescence to accomplish any change in warning, the manufacturer
still could not have satisfied state-law duties on its own.2 ' Thus, the plaintiffs
could only succeed on the basis of theories that afforded generic manufacturers
an independent capacity to comply with the requirements of state tort law.
The plaintiffs also argued that the generic manufacturers could have
employed the CBE process to revise their own label pending FDA approval.
In support of this contention, the plaintiffs pressed an interpretation of the
relevant FDA regulations which would permit generic labels to differ from the
FDA-approved brand-name label when "important new safety information
required a change to the labeling."23 The FDA disagreed, arguing that the
"same as" requirement governing generic-drug labels was overriding,2 and
that another regulation upon which the plaintiffs relied was simply irrelevant.25
Though there was a contest between dueling interpretations, the Court
concluded that the FDA's interpretation of its regulations was not "plainly
19. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2oo9) (holding that the FDCA does not preempt state-law
failure-to-warn claims and that brand-name manufacturers can be held liable for failures to
warn).
20. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2578; Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy at 28-
30, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, o9-1501). The FDA put forward the
same argument in support of the plaintiffs. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at i, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501).
21. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 ("[W]hen a party cannot satisfy its state duties without the
Federal Government's special permission and assistance, which is dependent on the exercise
of judgment by a federal agency, that party cannot independently satisfy those state duties
for pre-emption purposes.").
22. Id. at 2575.
23. Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy, supra note 20, at 34; see also id. at
33-35 (describing how the CBE process could "lead to a temporary difference in labeling").
24. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 20, at 15-
16.
25. Id. at 16 n.7.
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erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation"" and thus were accorded
dispositive Auer deference.27
Finally, and critically for purposes of this Comment, the plaintiffs mounted
a separate argument: that the generic manufacturers could have employed so-
called Dear Doctor letters" to "send additional warnings to prescribing
physicians." 9 The FDA acknowledged that no statutory provision or agency
regulation explicitly prohibited generic manufacturers from "unilaterally"
sending such letters. 30 However, an existing FDA regulation did address
"advertising" accompanying a drug, classifying it as "labeling" subject to the
sameness requirement.3 ' The FDA interpreted this regulation to apply to Dear
Doctor letters as well. 3 2 This interpretation meant that generic manufacturers
could not independently send Dear Doctor letters without violating regulatory
obligations.33
The plaintiffs made no argument contesting the interpretation the FDA
provided in its amicus brief. Indeed, the plaintiffs' merits brief did not once
refer to the regulation that, in the FDA's view, brought Dear Doctor letters
under the "labeling" regulatory regime. The plaintiffs' only attempt to contest
the FDA's interpretation focused on the interest adduced in support of
classifying Dear Doctor letters as advertising: that such letters from generic
manufacturers might pose a risk of misleading doctors and patients to believe
that generic formulations were safer than brand formulations.3 4 The plaintiffs
characterized this FDA concern as "speculat[ive] ."3s No other effort to address
the FDA interpretation appeared in the plaintiffs' brief.' Nor did they dispute
the applicability of Auer deference to the FDA's interpretation; their brief did
not once refer to the precedents regarding judicial deference to an agency's
26. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
27. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575-76.
28. 21 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2013).
29. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
3o. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 20, at 18.
31. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(1)(2) (2010).
32. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 20, at 18.
33. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 20, at 19.
34. Id.
3s. Brief for Respondents Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy, supra note 20, at 37.
36. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 ("Mensing and Demahy offer no argument that the FDA's
interpretation is plainly erroneous.").
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interpretation of its own regulations.37 In the face of this silence, Auer deference
followed almost as a matter of course. The Court accordingly deferred to the
interpretation: generic manufacturers could not independently send Dear
Doctor letters."
Having rejected all of the plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary, the Court
held that the FDCA made it impossible for generic manufacturers to comply
with, and so preempted, state tort law. 39 In the wake of Mensing, patients who
experience profound medical harms from taking generic drugs may not bring
failure to warn suits against the manufacturers of those drugs. As the Mensing
Court acknowledged, that decision apparently foreclosed recovery for such
plaintiffs.4o Plaintiffs nonetheless seeking recovery have turned to widely
rejected theories holding brand-name manufacturers liable for harm done by
generic formulations of their products. Some plaintiffs have argued that brand-
name manufacturers committed misrepresentation by failing to revise their
own labels, knowing that generic manufacturers were bound to the letter of
those labels.41 Others have relied on the learned-intermediary doctrine, arguing
that brand manufacturers were obliged to keep physicians apprised of possible
adverse reactions.42 An overwhelming majority of courts have rejected these
theories, including every federal court of appeals to consider the question.43
The Alabama Supreme Court, which in January 2013 joined the small minority
of courts permitting plaintiffs to continue litigating on similar theories, has
37. Neither Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), nor Auer appear in
respondents' brief on the merits, nor does the word "deference."
38. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576.
39. Id. at 2580-81.
40. Id. at 2581 ("We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal drug regulation has dealt
Mensing ... and others similarly situated.").
41. See, e.g., Mosley v. Wyeth, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1340 (S.D. Ala. 2010).
42. See, e.g., Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1101397, 2013 WI 135753 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013), reh'g granted
(June 13, 2013); see also Editorial, Innovator Liability, Take Two, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB0001424127887323324904579042850978337502.html.
43. The weight of authority is astounding. See, e.g., Gardley-Starks v. Pfizer, Inc., 917 F. Supp.
2d 597, 604 n-4 (N.D. Miss. 2013) (noting that "sixty-six decisions applying the law of
twenty-three different jurisdictions [have held] that brand name manufacturers of a drug
may not be held liable under any theory for injuries caused by the use of a generic
manufacturer's product").
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since granted the manufacturer's motion for reargument, leaving a rare
plaintiff victory in danger of reversal.44
Of course it is unsurprising that such theories are so widely condemned: as
the Fourth Circuit put it almost two decades ago, "a name brand
manufacturer's statements about its own product" lack a sufficient causal
relationship to "injuries caused by other manufacturers' products, over whose
production the name brand manufacturer had no control," to support
imposing liability on the brand-name manufacturer.4 Though always relying
on the relevant state's tort law, courts have almost uniformly come to the
conclusion -seemingly incontestable in the abstract-that the law only
provides for liability when the injured party was harmed by a product
manufactured by the defendant: "a name-brand manufacturer has no duty of
care to consumers that are not using the manufacturer's product."46 Alternative
theories placing liability on brand manufacturers have attracted some support,
but the courts approving such actions are likely motivated less by doctrinal
persuasiveness and more by the tragic consequences of denying recovery in
terrible circumstances. After Mensing, "[t]here is no good outcome in [such a]
case.
Yet Mensing itself leaves open an alternative path to liability that the parties
did not brief and the Court did not consider: the First Amendment's limits on
regulation of manufacturers' speech. Part II surveys recent developments in
speech jurisprudence and identifies the freedom of pharmaceutical
manufacturers to communicate with physicians. If the First Amendment
forbids the FDA's interpretation regarding Dear Doctor letters, a more
principled route for recovery exists. When speech is free, failure to speak may
create liability.
II. PHARMACEUTICAL FREEDOM OF SPEECH
This Part considers the recent developments in First Amendment analysis
of regulations limiting the speech of pharmaceutical manufacturers. Part III
argues that these principles forbid the FDA interpretation at issue in Mensing.
44. Weeks, 2013 WL 135753 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013), reh'g granted (June 13, 2013); see Editorial, supra
note 42.
45. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3 d 165, 170 (4 th Cir. 1994).
46. Demahy v. Schwarz Pharm., Inc., 702 F. 3d 177, 184 (5th Cir. 2012).
47. Weeks, 2013 WL 135753, at *20 (Murdock, J., dissenting).
502
123:49 5 2013
GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURER TORT LIABILITY
The Supreme Court examined the free-speech implications of
pharmaceutical regulation in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.48 Sorrell concerned a
Vermont law that prohibited brand-name manufacturers from accessing or
using "prescriber-identifying information" to tailor marketing to individual
physicians. 49 The Court held that "[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical
marketing" is a "form of expression protected by the" First Amendment.so It
found that the regulation, by targeting only marketing, and only where it was
conducted by pharmaceutical manufacturers, burdened certain disfavored
content by disfavored speakers. This required that the regulation satisfy
"heightened scrutiny" to survive.s' Finally, Sorrell considered whether the
government had shown that the regulation was consistent with the First
Amendment despite its speech costs. Vermont offered two primary
justifications: decreasing healthcare costs; and improving public health by
encouraging the use of cheaper, "safer" generics.s2 The Court concluded that
the regulation was not directly related to these interests and was inadequately
tailored 3: in short, the fact that "the State finds expression too persuasive does
not permit it to quiet the speech or to burden its messengers."4 Because it
imposed speaker- and content-based restrictions without a narrow, direct
relationship to adequate justifications,ss the Vermont statute was doomed.s'
48. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
49. Id. at 2659-60.
50. Id. at 2660.
51. Id. at 2667.
52. Id. at 2670. Vermont also sought to defend the law at issue in Sorrell on the ground that it
protected physician confidentiality. Id. at 2668-70. The Court rejected this argument as
largely specious, observing that the regulation simply "is not drawn to serve that interest."
Id. at 2668. Given that "pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with
anyone for any reason" other than marketing, and given the existence of additional broad
exceptions, the Court found that the regulation "d[id] not in itself advance privacy
interests." Id.
s3. Id. at 2670-72.
54. Id. at 2671.
ss. Id. at 2670-71.
s6. Sonell also concluded that the Vermont law failed the traditional Central Hudson standard
for restrictions on commercial speech. Id. at 2667-68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)). For this reason, in part, the
content of the Sorrell standard awaits elaboration by the lower courts and future cases at the
Supreme Court itself to clarify how much more rigorous than Central Hudson the
"heightened" scrutiny announced in Sorrell will be, and in what circumstances it will apply.
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Sorrell fundamentally refrained the constitutional status of pharmaceutical
marketing. The case says at a minimum that pharmaceutical manufacturer
speech has First Amendment value; open communication between
manufacturers and physicians is an important aspect of the free flow of ideas in
society. Nor is Sorrell's holding limited to the question of manufacturers' access
to and use of specific information about doctors. On the contrary, a recent
Second Circuit case demonstrated that Sorrell's innovation extends through the
broader regime governing the speech of pharmaceutical manufacturers. In
United States v. Caronia,57 the Second Circuit applied Sorrell in the context of
off-label drug marketing, one area in which federal regulations have
traditionally imposed extensive restraints on pharmaceutical manufacturers'
speech. Caronia provides further weight to the Sorrell proposition: federal
regulations of pharmaceutical speech must satisfy a heightened level of
scrutiny. The Second Circuit concluded that off-label marketing regulations as
currently written cannot do so. Careful analysis of Caronia's reasoning suggests
that the FDA's regulations on generic pharmaceutical speech also offend the
Constitution.
Current off-label marketing regulations are based on the rule that drug
manufacturers must receive approval for each new proposed indication for a
formulation,ss requiring a demonstration through clinical trials of the
application's safety. 59 Drug manufacturers may not "misbrand," or indicate
that a drug's intended uses include anything other than those approved by the
FDA."o FDA regulations identify several forms of evidence that can indicate a
manufacturer intended to offer a drug for off-label uses, including "oral or
written statements" by manufacturers or their representatives.6
Despite these marketing prohibitions, the FDCA expressly permits doctors
to prescribe drugs for unapproved indications.12 Indeed, off-label prescriptions
are "an accepted and necessary corollary" of the regulatory goal of achieving
57. 703 F. 3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
58. 21 U.S.C. 5 355(d) (2012).
s. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 613 (1973).
60. 21 U.S.C. S 35 2(f) (2012).
61. 21 C.F.R. 5 201.128 (2013).
62. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed
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patient safety without interfering with medical practice. However, the
decision regarding off-label uses is left to doctors, and manufacturers or their
representatives may not advertise a drug for an unapproved "intended use."6 4
Caronia, a criminal prosecution for off-label marketing, concluded that this
regime cannot survive in the post-Sorrell environment. Alfred Caronia, a
pharmaceutical sales representative, made statements to doctors that a drug
could be prescribed for a number of off-label uses.6 s The government charged
Caronia with criminal violations of the FDCA misbranding provisions.66
Caronia moved to dismiss on the ground that the misbranding provisions
"unconstitutionally restricted his right to free speech" under the First
Amendment.6 7 The district court judge, ruling before Sorrell was decided,
rejected this argument and concluded that the FDCA's misbranding provisions
were necessary to provide an adequate penal backstop to the FDA approval
process. 8
The Second Circuit reversed the First Amendment holding, relying heavily
on the intervening Sorrell decision.6 9 The panel majority held that the
misbranding provisions, like the Vermont law in Sorrell, discriminated both
against content, forbidding only off-label marketing, and against speakers,
63. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001).
64. 21 C.F.R. §5 201.5, 201.128 (2013) (including among "directions for use," which constitute
the total "intended uses" of the drug as offered on the market, items such as "oral, written,
printed, or graphic advertising").
6s. Id. at 156.
66. Id. at 157.
67. Id. at 158.
68. United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401-02 (E.D.N.Y. 20o8), vacated, 703 F. 3d 149(2d Cir. 2012); see also id. at 401 (noting that misbranding prohibitions are "one of the 'few
mechanisms available' to the FDA to ensure that manufacturers will not seek approval only
for certain limited uses of drugs, then promote that same drug for off-label uses, effectively
circumventing the FDA's new drug requirements" (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v.
Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 72 (D.D.C. 1998))).
69. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152. Though Sorrell involved the speech rights of a corporation, the
Second Circuit had no trouble applying the speech standard Sorrell established in an
individual's criminal prosecution. The relevant regulations apply equally to speech either by
the manufacturer directly or its representatives, 21 C.F.R. 5 201.128 (2013), and the Second
Circuit treated the prosecution of Caronia individually as "criminaliz[ation of] the
promotion of off-label drug use by pharmaceutical manufacturers," Caronia, 703 F.3d at 164,
presumably on the theory that off-label promotion is ultimately "by" the manufacturer
whether conducted via corporate mailings or by individual sales representatives as agents of
their corporate employer.
505
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
prohibiting only speech by pharmaceutical manufacturers. 70 Under Sorrell,
these regulations received heightened scrutiny.7' The FDA presented two
justifications: preserving the effectiveness of the FDA approval process and
avoiding patient exposure to dangerous, unapproved indications.72 The panel
concluded that the regulations did not directly advance these interests, as they
permitted physicians to make such prescriptions but suppressed information
that would allow them to do so safely,73 and also found that narrower options
existed that would accomplish these goals without First Amendment harms.
To avoid the constitutional problems, the panel construed the FDA regulations
not to prohibit manufacturers and their representatives from engaging in
truthful off-label promotion.74
The consequences of this holding are potentially significant. As Judge
Livingston wrote in dissent, the holding "calls into question the very
foundations of our century-old system of drug regulation." 75 Nonetheless, the
result in Caronia came as no surprise to commentators: almost every published
article considering the interaction between Sorrell and the off-label regulations
concluded that the regulations could not survive eventual review under the
standard Sorrell had announced.7' Development of these legal questions will
70. Caronia, 703 F-3d at 165. The panel majority also held in the alternative that the regulations
failed the less-restrictive Central Hudson test for commercial speech, Cent. Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), because the regulations
did not directly advance the government interest and narrower options existed. Caronia, 703
F.3 d at 165-69.
71. Caronia, 703 F.3d at 165.
72. Id. at166.
73. Id. at 167.
74. Id. at 168.
75. Id. at 169 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., John N. Joseph et al., Is Sorrell the Death Knell for FDA's Off-Label Marketing
Restrictions?, J. HEALTH & LiFE Sci. L., Feb. 2012 at 1; Erin E. Bennett, Comment, Central
Hudson-Plus: Why Off-Label Pharmaceutical Speech Will Find Its Voice, 49 Hous. L. REV.
459, 461 (2012); Isabelle Bibet-Kalinyak, Note, A Critical Analysis of Sorrell v. Ims Health,
Inc.: Pandora's Box at Best, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191, 24o (2012); Thea Cohen, Note, The
First Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: Challenges to the
Constitutionality of the FDA's Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 49 Am . CluM.
L. REv. 1945, 1946-47 (2012); Gayland 0. Hethcoat II, Note, Regulating Pharmaceutical
Marketing Afier Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 15 QuINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 187,201-02 (2012).
So6
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have to wait, as the government sought neither en banc review in the Second
Circuit nor certiorari from the Supreme Court?
Caronia is interesting in its own right as an illustration of how speech
principles are altering the landscape in multiple regulatory contexts. It also
demonstrates the vitality of the Sorrell standard and its relevance for the
regulations the Court considered and accepted in Mensing. The First
Amendment analysis announced in Sorrell and applied in Caronia offers a way
to shift liability for pharmaceutical harms back to generic manufacturers.
Relitigating Mensing based on Sorrell -this time bringing a meaningful attack
against the validity of the FDA's interpretation of its regulations regarding
Dear Doctor letters-should invalidate that interpretation and afford generic
manufacturers the freedom and duty to provide physicians with truthful
warning information about potential harms. In turn, plaintiffs should be able
to recover on tort claims against generic drug manufacturers who fail to do so.
Part III explores this First Amendment approach to Mensing.
Ill. LIBERATING GENERIC MANUFACTURER SPEECH-AND
RESTORING TORT LIABILITY
Caronia destabilizes one of the critical assumptions animating Mensing. The
Court in Mensing accepted the FDA's interpretation that generic manufacturers
may not send Dear Doctor letters to inform physicians of possible risks?" This
conclusion is unsurprising, as respondents failed to contest seriously the FDA's
interpretation of its regulations. Rendered without the benefit of briefing or
argument on the merits of the underlying interpretation, the Dear Doctor
section of Mensing amounts to nothing more than recognition of Auer
deference in the absence of an argument to the contrary.79 However, in light of
Sorrell and Caronia, the Dear Doctor interpretation cannot endure, and the
Mensing holding based on that interpretation should be reconsidered. Generic
manufacturers should have the ability to send such letters, and,
correspondingly, they should face liability for harms caused by their failure to
do so.
77. See Government Will Not Appeal 2nd Circuit's Ruling in Caronia, FDA ENFORCEMENT MANUAL
NEWSL., Feb. 2013, at i; Jose P. Sierra, Government Takes a "Pass" on the First Amendment,
LEXOLOGY (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5818423f
-28 7 8- 4 2d9-8bae-afc3342969cc.
78. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576 (2011).
7g. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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Despite the deep tension between Sorrell and Mensing, which were decided
by the Court on the same day,so the opinions did not directly contradict each
other. The Mensing plaintiffs did not contest the FDA's interpretation
regarding Dear Doctor letters in any meaningful way -and they could not have
known that the Court in Sorrell would offer such a robust First Amendment
ruling. The First Amendment's implications for the entire pharmaceutical
regulatory regime have only emerged with elaboration of Sorrell's analysis.
Indeed, no reference to the First Amendment or speech analysis of any kind
appears in the plaintiffs' brief or in the FDA's amicus brief in Mensing.8 '
Nonetheless, the Constitution should forbid the FDA's interpretation
regarding Dear Doctor letters, in turn enabling those harmed by generic drugs
to recover for their injuries. Sorrell and Caronia provide the analysis. First,
under Sorrell, generic manufacturer "speech in aid of pharmaceutical
marketing" is a form of protected expression.82 Sorrell-and Caronia-
concluded that the implicated regulations imposed speaker- and content-based
burdens and consequently required review under heightened scrutiny.
Similarly, the FDA's Dear Doctor letter interpretation actively discriminates
against speakers: brand-name manufacturers may independently send Dear
Doctor letters, but generic manufacturers may not. The interpretation also
burdens specific content: generic manufacturers may send approved
advertising material to physicians, but they may not communicate unapproved
information, even when truthful.3
Admittedly, were the Court compelled to confront the contradiction
between Sorrell and Mensing that this Comment identifies, it might avoid the
confrontation by limiting Sorrell such that its apparently broad expansion of
speech rights would not extend to cover speech designed to communicate risks
to doctors. However, if Sorrell is to apply anywhere beyond its facts, this
context seems appropriate. The Court's concerns in Sorrell regarding
Vermont's speech regulation are squarely relevant. The FDA's interpretation
so. Mensing and Sorrell were announced on June 23, 2011.
81. Petitioners in Mensing made one reference to the First Amendment in their merits brief, but
on an unrelated topic, referring to whether or not manufacturers may request that the FDA
reconsider the warning information approved for a given drug. Brief of Petitioners PLIVA,
Inc. et al. at 48, Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (Nos. 09-993, 09-1039, 09-1501). This Petition
Clause analysis was uncontested before the Court and is unrelated to the validity under the
Free Speech Clause of the FDA's interpretation of its Dear Doctor letter regulations.
82. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
83. Such restrictions seem to run against the logic of Sorrell. See id. at 2670-72.
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serves to bar one category of actor from engaging in speech available to all
other actors, based solely on concerns regarding the potential effect of such
speech when wielded inappropriately. Sorrell's declaration that "speech in aid
of pharmaceutical marketing" is a form of protected expression was no mere
flight of rhetoric: it was a recognition that the free flow of information "has
great relevance in the fields of medicine and public health, where information
can save lives."* That observation is even more sharply true in the context of
pharmaceutical risk than in the area of prescriber information that Sorrell
examined. The freedom and obligation to send Dear Doctor letters - and the
corresponding imposition of liability for the injuries of harmed plaintiffs
attributable to manufacturers' failure to send such letters-would lead to
better-informed doctors and lower incidence of pharmaceutical harm. Sorrell
should thus apply to Dear Doctor letters, and the FDA interpretation should
receive heightened scrutiny.
Of course, the FDA's interpretation would still survive First Amendment
analysis if it were narrowly drawn to directly advance appropriate interests.
After all, the speaker- and content-based analysis above could invalidate the
entire generic labeling regime, in the absence of adequate justification. The
interests behind the duty of sameness - safeguarding patient health by
ensuring therapeutic equivalence and decreasing healthcare costs by increasing
availability of cheap generic formulations -are of high moment. Fortunately,
the sameness requirement directly advances these goals by simplifying the
entry of generic manufacturers and guaranteeing that FDA-approved warnings
are exactly reproduced. Nor are the regulations badly drawn. The burden on
manufacturer speech, limited to the content of the label, goes no further than
necessary to further the interests involved. In short, the generic labeling regime
should withstand any First Amendment attack.
The FDA interpretation to which the Court deferred in Mensing, extending
the sameness obligation to all communications from generic manufacturers, is
another matter. The FDA justified this interpretation based on the risk that
permitting generic manufacturers to send letters to doctors independently
would create the perception that the generic formulation was not
therapeutically identical to the brand-name version.8s Ensuring therapeutic
equivalence, both perceived and actual, is the heart of the generic regulatory
regime and could justify speech burdens. For example, the FDA interpretation
84. Id. at 2664.
85. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 20, at 19.
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would surely survive if it only barred misleading communications that created
such a perception.8 ' But a Dear Doctor letter providing truthful, impartial
information about both brand and generic formulations would pose no risk of
false or misleading communication.
The current interpretation does not advance the FDA's asserted
justification. Brand-name manufacturers may send letters independently,
risking the equally damaging perception that brand drugs are therapeutically
advantageous; only after the FDA approved the letter could generic
manufacturers follow suit.7 Nor is the interpretation narrowly drawn. A
different, narrower interpretation would better ensure perceived therapeutic
identity at a lower speech cost: letters implying therapeutic advantage could
still be construed as "advertising," in accordance with the existing FDA
interpretation. False letters would remain actionable both for violating
regulatory requirements and for fraud.8
The FDA could alternatively defend its interpretation as seeking to advance
its overall goal of ensuring patient safety. If so, the interpretation would fail
constitutional muster more seriously. Content-based speech restrictions cannot
be justified even by the "fear that people would make bad decisions if given
truthful information."9* The FDA interpretation, even worse, prevents
physicians from making good decisions based on true information. Thus, the
FDA interpretation violates the First Amendment rights of generic
manufacturers and works to the detriment of public health.
For these reasons, the Dear Doctor interpretation cannot survive the
analysis that Sorrell requires and Caronia applied. The Court should instead
construe the regulations to avoid constitutional violations. Rather than
accepting the FDA's broad reading, the Court could adopt the narrower
interpretation identified above: only misleading letters implying an advantage
to one class of drugs should be forbidden. Truthful, impartial letters simply
86. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672; United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
87. Cf Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150, 152-53 (Ct. App. 2013)(rejecting a generic manufacturer's Mensing-based preemption claim when "the brand-name
drug label was updated but the generic drug manufacturers failed to update their products'
labels accordingly"); id. at 162 (collecting comparable cases).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Harkonen, sPo F. App'x 633 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished)
(upholding a fraud conviction for false pharmaceutical promotional materials).
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setting out health risks should be classed as communications protected by the
Constitution.
Once no longer precluded by federal regulations from satisfying their
duties under state tort law, generic manufacturers would then also face tort
liability for neglecting to send such letters when they possessed sufficient
evidence of adverse reactions. Patients who suffer harm from generic
formulations should be able to recover on meritorious tort claims against
generic manufacturers who fail to communicate warning information.
The benefits of this conclusion are numerous. It allows plaintiffs to recover
for their injuries. It harmonizes tort law with respect to pharmaceutical
injuries: patients will no longer confront the absurd prospect of suing brand-
name manufacturers whose products they never purchased. Nor will courts
face a decision between a principled application of causation requirements and
the desire to see individuals compensated for preventable injuries. Generic
manufacturers can exult in liberation from the First Amendment burdens of
speech restraints. Far better, the manufacturers actually responsible for
substantial injuries will be held to account, resting the costs of accidents on
their most natural bearers. And the proper allocation of these costs will drive
generic manufacturers to keep physicians informed of potential adverse
reactions, decreasing the incidence of injuries as a whole.
CONCLUSION
This is a moment of great opportunity for solving the problems left by
Mensing. A line of recent major cases continues to articulate and secure the First
Amendment's protections in this area of the law. Simultaneously, the FDA is
reconsidering the regulations that provided the basis for decision in Mensing,
no doubt influenced by the roar of commentary deriding the policy
consequences of the Mensing holding.
No policymaker or legal commentator, however, has yet appreciated
Mensing's constitutional difficulties, independent of its undoubted negative
policy consequences. This Comment has identified a contradiction between
Mensing and free speech jurisprudence. The Mensing holding is unstable and
should not endure: it assumed the validity of a regulatory interpretation that
violates the Constitution. Whether through the courts or via regulatory reform,
vindicating the speech interests at play here will also solve the conundrum of
what to do with injured plaintiffs after Mensing.
Though resolving these problems may require bold lawyering, the
argument stands on firm ground. First Amendment principles, as announced
in Sorrell and applied in Caronia, cannot permit the FDA interpretation at issue
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to survive. Generic manufacturers should face liability when they possess
critical safety information and fail to communicate it.
CONNOR SULLIVAN
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